object of History in a more definite shape than before； that in which Freedom obtains objectivity；
and lives in the enjoyment of this objectivity。 For Law is the objectivity of Spirit； volition in its true
form。 Only that will which obeys law； is free； for it obeys itself … it is independent and so free。
When the State or our country constitutes a munity of existence； when the subjective will of
man submits to laws； … the contradiction between Liberty and Necessity vanishes。 The Rational
has necessary existence as being the reality and substance of things； and we are free in recognising
it as law； and following it as the substance of our own being。 The objective and the subjective will
are then reconciled； and present one identical homogeneous whole。 For the morality （Sittlichkeit）
of the State is not of that ethical （moralische） reflective kind； in which one's own conviction bears
sway； this latter is rather the peculiarity of the modern time； orality is based
on the principle of abiding by one's duty ＇to the state at large＇。 An Athenian citizen did what was
required of him； as it were from instinct； but if I reflect on the object of nay activity； I must have
the consciousness that my will has been called into exercise。 But morality is Duty … substantial
Right … a 〃second nature〃 as it has been justly called； for the first nature of man is his primary
merely animal existence。
§ 42
The development in extenso of the Idea of the State belongs to the Philosophy of Right； but it
must be observed that in the theories of our time various errors are current respecting it； which
pass for established truths； and have bee fixed prejudices。 We will mention only a few of
them； giving prominence to such as have a reference to the object of our history。 The error which
first meets us is the direct contradictory of our principle that the state presents the realisation of
Freedom； the opinion； viz。； that man is free by nature； but that in society； in the State … to which
nevertheless he is irresistibly impelled … he must limit this natural freedom。 That man is free by
Nature is quite correct in one sense； viz。； that he is so according to the Idea of Humanity； but we
imply thereby that lie is such only in virtue of his destiny … that he has an undeveloped power to
bee such； for the 〃Nature〃 of an object is exactly synonymous with its 〃Idea。〃 But the view in
question imports more than this。 When man is spoken of as 〃free by Nature；〃 the mode of his
existence as well as his destiny is implied。 His merely natural and primary condition is intended。 In
this sense a 〃state of Nature〃 is assumed in which mankind at large are in the possession of their
natural rights with the unconstrained exercise and enjoyment of their freedom。 This assumption is
not indeed raised to the dignity of the historical fact； it would indeed be difficult； were the attempt
seriously made； to point out any such condition as actually existing； or as having ever occurred。
Examples of a savage state of life can be pointed out； but they are marked by brutal passions and
deeds of violence； while； however rude and simple their conditions； they involve social
arrangements which （to use the mon phrase） restrain freedom。 That assumption is one of
those nebulous images which theory produces； an idea which it cannot avoid originating； but which
it fathers upon real existence； without sufficient historical justification。
§ 43
What we find such a state of Nature to be in actual experience； answers exactly to the Idea of a
merely natural condition。 Freedom as the ideal of that which is original and natural； does not exist
as original and natural。 Rather must it be first sought out and won； and that by an incalculable
medial discipline of the intellectual and moral powers。 The state of Nature is； therefore；
predominantly that of injustice and violence； of untamed natural impulses； of inhuman deeds and
feelings。 Limitation is certainty produced by Society and the State； but it is a limitation of the mere
brute emotions and rude instincts； as also； in a more advanced stage of culture； of the
premeditated self…will of caprice and passion。 This kind of constraint is part of the instrumentality
by which only； the consciousness of Freedom and the desire for its attainment； in its true … that is
Rational and Ideal form … can be obtained。 To the Ideal of Freedom； Law and Morality are
indispensably requisite： and they are in and for themselves； universal existences； objects and aims；
which are discovered only by the activity of thought； separating itself from the merely sensuous；
and developing itself； in opposition thereto； and which must on the other hand； be introduced into
and incorporated with the originally sensuous will； and that contrarily to its natural inclination。 The
perpetually recurring misapprehension of Freedom consists in regarding that term only in its
formal； subjective sense； abstracted from its essential objects and aims； thus a constraint put upon
impulse； desire； passion … pertaining to the particular individual as such … a limitation of caprice and
self…will is regarded as a fettering of Freedom。 We should on the contrary look upon such
limitation as the indispensable proviso of emancipation。 Society and the State are the very
conditions in which Freedom is realised。
§ 44
We must notice a second view； contravening the principle of the development of moral relations
into a legal form。 The patriarchal condition is regarded … either in reference to the entire race of
man； or to some branches of it … as exclusively that condition of things； in which the legal element is
bined with a due recognition of the moral and emotional parts of our nature； and in which
justice as united with these； truly and really influences the intercourse of the social units。 The basis
of the patriarchal condition is the family relation； which develops the primary form of conscious
morality； succeeded by that of the State as its second phase。 The patriarchal condition is one of
transition； in which the family has already advanced to the position of a race or people； where the
union； therefore； has already ceased to be simply a bond of love and confidence； and has bee
one of plighted service。 We must first examine the ethical principle of the Family。 The Family may
be reckoned as virtually a single person； since its members have either mutually surrendered their
individual personality； （and consequently their legal position towards each other； with the rest of
their particular interests and desires） as in the case of the Parents； or have not yet attained such an
independent personality； … （the Children； … who are primarily in that merely natural condition
already mentioned。） They live； therefore； in a unity of feeling； love； confidence； and faith in each
other。 And in a relation of mutual love； the one individual has the consciousness of himself in the
consciousness of the other； he lives out of self； and in this mutual self…renunciation each regains the
life that had been virtually transferred to the other； gains； in fact； that other's existence and his own；
as involved with that other。 The farther interests connected with the necessities and external
concerns of life； as well as the development that has to take place within their circle； i。e。 of the
children constitute a mon object for the members of the Family。 The Spirit of the Family … the
Penates … form one substantial being； as much as the Spirit of a People in the State； and morality in
both cases consists in a feeling； a consciousness； and a will； not limited to individual personality
and interest； but embracing the mon interests of the members generally。 But this unity is in the
case of the Family essentially one of feeling； not advancing beyond the limits of the merely
natural。 The piety of the Family relation should be respected in the highest degree by the State；
by its means the State obtains as its members individuals who are already moral （for as mere
persons they are not） and who in uniting to form a state bring with them that sound basis of a
political edifice … the capacity of feeling one with a Whole。 But the expansion of the Family to a
patriarchal unity carries us beyond the ties of blood…relationship … the simply natural elements of
that basis； and outside of these limits the members of the munity must enter upon the position
of independent personality。 A review of the patriarchal condition； in extenso； would lead us to
give special attention to the Theocratical Constitution。 The head of the patriarchal clan is also its
priest。 If the Family in its general relations； is not yet separated from civic society and the state； the
separation of religion from it has also not yet taken place； and so much the less since the piety of
the hearth is itself a profoundly subjective state of feeling。
§ 45
We have considered two aspects of Freedom； … the objective and the subjective； if； therefore；
Freedom is asserted to consist in the individuals of a State all agreeing in its arrangements it is
evident that only the subjective aspect is regarded。 The natural inference from this principle is； that
no law can be valid without the approval of all。 This difficulty is attempted to be obviated by the
decision that the minority must yield to the。 majority； the majority therefore bear the sway。 But
long ago J。 J。 Rousseau remarked； that in that case there would be no longer freedom； for the will
of the minority would cease to be respected。 At the Polish Diet each single member had to give
his consent before any political step could be taken； and this kind of freedom it was that ruined the
State。 Besides； it is a dangerous and false prejudice； that the People alone have reason and
insight； and know what justice is； for each popular faction may represent itself as the People； and
the question as to what constitutes the State is one of advanced science； and not of popular
decision。
§ 46
If the principle of regard for the individual will is recognised as the only basis of political liberty；
viz。； that nothing should be done by or for the State to which all the members of the body politic
have not given their sanction； we have； properly speaking； no Constitution。 The only arrangement
that would be necessary； would be； first； a centre having no will of its own but which should take
into consideration what appeared to be the necessities of the State； and； secondly； a contrivance
for calling the members of the State together； for taking the votes； and for performing the
arithmetical operations of reckoning and paring the number of votes for the different
propositions； and thereby deciding upon them。 The State is an abstraction； having even its generic
existence in its citizens； but it is an actuality； and its simply generic existence must embody itself in
individual will and activity。 The want of government and political administration in general is felt；
this necessitates the selection and separation from the rest of those who have to take the helm in
political